One currency and many modes of wage formation : why the eurozone is too heterogeneous for the euro by Höpner, Martin & Lutter, Mark
M
PI
fG
 D
is
cu
ss
io
n
 P
ap
er
 
MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/14
One Currency and Many Modes of Wage Formation
Why the Eurozone Is Too Heterogeneous for the Euro
Martin Höpner and Mark Lutter
Martin Höpner and Mark Lutter 
One Currency and Many Modes of Wage Formation: Why the Eurozone Is Too Heterogeneous  
for the Euro
MPIfG Discussion Paper 14/14  
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln  
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne  
August 2014
MPIfG Discussion Paper 
ISSN 0944-2073 (Print) 
ISSN 1864-4325 (Internet)
© 2014 by the authors
Martin Höpner is head of the Research Group on the Political Economy of European Integration at the 
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne. 
hoepner@mpifg.de
Mark Lutter is head of the Research Group on Transnational Diffusion of Innovation at the Max Planck 
Institute for the Study of Societies, Cologne. 
lutter@mpifg.de
Downloads  
www.mpifg.de  
Go to Publications / Discussion Papers
Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung  
Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies  
Paulstr. 3 | 50676 Cologne | Germany
Tel. +49 221 2767-0  
Fax +49 221 2767-555
www.mpifg.de  
info@mpifg.de
Höpner/Lutter: One Currency and Many Modes of Wage Formation iii
Abstract
Synchronization of national price inflation is the crucial precondition for a well-func-
tioning fixed exchange rate regime. Given the close relationship between wage inflation 
and price inflation, convergence of price inflation requires the synchronization of wage 
inflation. Why did the convergence of wage inflation fail during the first ten years of 
the euro? While differences in economic growth shape the inflation of labor costs, our 
argument is that the type of wage regime has an additional, independent impact. In 
coordinated labor market regimes, increases in nominal unit labor costs tended to fall 
below the ECB’s inflation target, while in uncoordinated labor regimes, the respective 
increases tended to exceed the European inflation target. To show this, we analyze data 
from 1999–2008 for twelve euro members. We estimate the increases of nominal unit 
labor costs both in the overall economy and in manufacturing as dependent variables, 
test a variety of labor- and wage-regime indicators, and control for a battery of eco-
nomic, political, and institutional variables. Neither the transfer of wage coordination 
from the North to the South nor the transfer of adjustment pressure from the South to 
the North is likely to solve the problem of inner-European exchange-rate distortions.
Zusammenfassung
Die Synchronisation nationaler Inflationsraten ist die entscheidende Voraussetzung für 
ein funktionsfähiges Regime fester Wechselkurse. Wegen des engen Zusammenhangs 
zwischen Lohn- und Preisinflation ist hierfür eine Synchronisation der Steigerungen 
der Lohnstückkosten vonnöten. Warum kam während der ersten zehn Euro-Jahre keine 
Konvergenz der Lohnauftriebe zustande? Dies lag zum einen an den unterschiedlichen 
Wachstumsdynamiken der Euro-Teilnehmer, zum anderen an einem institutionellen 
Unterschied zwischen den Euro-Ländern: den Lohnregimen. In Ländern mit koordi-
nierten Lohnregimen unterschritten die Steigerungen der Lohnstückkosten im Trend 
das Inflationsziel der Europäischen Zentralbank, in Ländern mit unkoordinierten 
Lohnregimen fielen die Lohnsteigerungen hingegen höher aus. Um dies zu zeigen, ana-
lysieren wir Daten von zwölf Euro-Ländern für die Jahre 1999 bis 2008. Wir betrachten 
die nominalen Steigerungen der Lohnstückkosten sowohl gesamtwirtschaftlich als auch 
bezogen auf das verarbeitende Gewerbe und verwenden unterschiedliche Lohnregime-
Indikatoren als erklärende Variablen. Zudem kontrollieren wir für zahlreiche ökono-
mische, politische und institutionelle Kontextbedingungen. Weder eine etwaige Über-
tragung der Lohnkoordination vom Norden auf den Süden noch eine Übertragung 
der ökonomischen Anpassungslast vom Süden auf den Norden scheinen geeignet, das 
Problem der innereuropäischen realen Wechselkursverzerrungen zu lösen.
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One Currency and Many Modes of Wage Formation:  
Why the Eurozone Is Too Heterogeneous for the Euro
1 Introduction: Desert racing without toolkits
Entering a currency union is a risky bet. The potential gains are obvious. Currency 
unions eliminate the uncertainty of nominal exchange rates. This should stabilize the 
expectations of transnational economic actors, reduce their liquidity preference, and, as 
a consequence, increase their readiness to trade and invest. The more credible, reliable, 
and trustworthy the fixed exchange rate regime is, the more such effects should occur. 
The most credible form of a fixed exchange rate regime is the currency union (de Grau-
we 2012: 105–113). However, currency unions eliminate not only the uncertainty about 
nominal exchange rates, but also the availability of nominal exchange rate adjustments 
as a decisive macroeconomic policy tool. Member states cannot use nominal devalua-
tions and revaluations as adjustment tools once inflation divergences occur. The crucial 
precondition for a well-functioning currency union is, therefore, the capacity to syn-
chronize price inflation.1 Given the close relationship between the inflation of nominal 
unit labor costs (hereafter: NULC) and price inflation, synchronization of price inflation 
in turn presupposes synchronization of NULC inflation. Yet, if NULC developments 
diverge over a longer period of time, the fact that economic actors have been freed from 
the uncertainties of nominal exchange rates becomes a problem. Entering a currency 
union is like a jeep race through the desert in which teams leave their toolkits behind 
in order to make their cars as light as possible – in the hope that the toolkits will not be 
needed anyway.
The euro crisis indicates that the Eurozone has lost this bet. Since the introduction of 
the euro in 1999, substantial differences have arisen with regard to NULC inflation and 
price inflation, with Austria and Germany positioned at the stagnating end of the scale 
and the Southern economies positioned at the inflating end. In the context of these 
distortions of the real exchange rate, the nonavailability of the nominal de- and re-
We thank Lena Ehret for research assistance and Lothar Krempel, Florian Rödl, Fritz W. Scharpf, 
Armin Schäfer, and Annika Wederhake for helpful comments.
1 This is why the national inflation preference figured prominently in Fleming’s theory of opti-
mal currency areas. Interestingly with regard to the argument in this paper, Fleming noted that 
“particular importance attaches to the degree of co-ordination or unification that exists among 
the trade union and employers’ organisations that are active in the various countries of the fixed 
exchange rate area. So long as these bodies are organised on a purely national basis, and so long 
as moods and motivations affecting the workers are different and change differently in different 
countries, there will probably arise shifts and divergencies in relative labour costs which will 
require for their correction adjustments in relative exchange rates” (Fleming 1971: 477).
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valuation tool has indeed become a problem.2,3 In 2012, for example, a Goldman Sachs 
study indicated that the German economy needed a revaluation of about 25 percent 
and the Portuguese economy a devaluation of about 35 percent, with all other euro 
members positioned in between these two extremes.4 If the option of adjusting the 
nominal exchange rate had been available since the mid-2000s, it would have undoubt-
edly been used. However, since the nominal exchange rate was fixed, euro countries had 
to choose between ignoring distortions of the real exchange rate (a bad choice because 
of the immediate consequences for trade and indebtedness and the medium- to long-
term consequences for interregional economic development) and pushing overvalued 
economies towards internal devaluations (another bad choice because the adverse so-
cial consequences made it rather unlikely that democratically elected politicians would 
agree on the respective strategy).5 We all know what then happened. This study sheds 
light on why the bet was lost in the first place, thereby highlighting the political-eco-
nomic heterogeneity of the Eurozone and, in particular, the heterogeneity of European 
labor and wage-bargaining regimes.
2 A brief review of the debate
In 2012, Lo wrote a fascinating literature review on the emergence of the financial crisis. 
He read and reviewed 21 books and came to the conclusion that they offered no less 
than 21 different causal narratives (Lo 2012). The situation is not very different when 
we turn to the euro crisis. A variety of causal interpretations coexist, and, although dif-
ferent, they each possess internal plausibility. In order to clarify our starting point and 
our contribution, we will concentrate in the following not on the differences, but on 
the common core within one particular strand of the literature: the strand that inter-
prets the euro crisis not mainly as an outcome of irresponsible budget policies of cer-
tain European governments, but as a symptom of deeper macroeconomic imbalances. 
2 See Johnston/Regan (2014), who show that inflation’s impact on the current account is condi-
tional on the exchange rate regime. 
3 Regionally heterogeneous price developments exist in other common currency areas as well, 
such as the United States. A unique European problem was, however, the persistence of inflation 
divergences. In the US, inflation differences of more than one percentage point rarely persist 
longer than two years. During the first ten Eurozone years, in contrast, the very same countries 
remained on the upper and on the lower ends of the inflation scale. See European Central Bank 
(2005: 62–63; 2012: 71). 
4 See the details in Sinn (2014a: 120). The most alarming finding of that study was the devalua-
tion need of about 20 percent in the case of France.
5 See our conclusion, in which we also discuss reflation in the North as an alternative to deflation 
in the South.
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Notwithstanding emphases on different parts of the causal narrative, it is fair to argue 
that many political-economy narratives on the euro crisis agree on the following causal 
building blocks, or at least on most of them.6
In Southern Europe, the euro facilitated the availability of cheap credit for two reasons: 
risk premia on government bonds declined because the risk linked to the nominal ex-
change rate was eliminated, and ex ante higher inflation rates led to dysfunctionally 
low real interest rates. Regardless of whether debt was mainly issued by the state (as in 
Greece) or by private actors (as in Spain), the result was a debt-driven boom in which 
trade deficits and current account deficits rose. Again, that happened for two reasons: 
first, rising demand led to rising imports; second, due to rising wages, the respective 
countries forfeited competitive strength.7 In 2008, triggered by the Lehman crisis, capi-
tal markets began to doubt the ability of Southern countries to finance their current ac-
count deficits. Note that, in this account, the debt crisis is a causally subordinated – but 
nevertheless disastrous – effect of distorted real exchange rates, rather than the ultimate 
cause of the current problems.8
Even more succinctly put, the common core reads: cheap credit  growth  NULC 
inflation  price inflation  competitive disadvantage  current account deficit 
 debt crisis.9 While we agree with the essence of this account, we will show in the 
following that substantially more variance can be explained by making the narrative 
only slightly more complicated. We concentrate on the causes of heterogeneous NULC 
increases. While our data will confirm that growth differentials have indeed (and unsur-
prisingly) contributed to the divergences in NULC inflation, we will show that a par-
ticular form of institutional differences had an independent effect on NULC inflation, 
too: the heterogeneity of inner-European labor and wage-bargaining regimes. This 
point has consequences for the prospects of convergence in the Eurozone. Due to the 
stickiness of labor regime institutions, the Eurozone’s inability to synchronize inflation 
is not likely to be remedied in the foreseeable future. Therefore, we have reason to be-
6 For example, parts of this “emerging consensus” are to be found in Collignon (2013); Flassbeck/
Lapavitsas (2013: chap. 2); Giavazzi/Spaventa (2011); Hall (2012); Jones (2011: 291–299); Krug-
man (2011a); Scharpf (2013: section 2; 2014: section 2); Sinn (2014: chaps. 2–4 and 8; 2014: 
sections 2–4).
7 The very reverse happened in Northern Europe, especially in Germany: Germany had an ex ante 
low inflation rate, was therefore confronted with a dysfunctionally high real interest rate, and 
did not profit from the risk premia convergence of government bonds. It accumulated current 
account surpluses for two reasons: first, the lack of internal demand led to low imports; second, 
due to low NULC increases, Germany’s goods gained a competitive cost advantage. 
8 This stands in contrast to large parts of the public debate in the countries of the former deutsch-
mark bloc, which claim that the crisis was caused mainly by unsound budget policies in South-
ern Europe. A fine example is Wirtschaftsrat Deutschland (2011).
9 Note that another causal arrow goes directly from growth to the trade deficit (because of the 
hunger for imports in the boom countries and the lack of a respective hunger in the stagnation 
countries). For the emergence of trade balances, credit-driven Southern imports were no less 
important than the overvaluation-driven lack of exports.
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lieve that the Eurozone will continue to have a structurally determined need for the 
toolkit that we mentioned in the introduction – flexibility in nominal exchange rates – 
and that the Eurozone may have to pay a significant price for having left it behind.
By emphasizing the role of wage bargaining, we confirm a point that has been made 
by Collignon (2009), Höpner (2013), Ramskogler (2013), and, in particular, Hancké 
and colleagues (Hancké 2013a and b; Johnston 2012; Johnston/Hancké/Pant 2013). To 
date, Hancké’s book (2013a) is the most elaborated account of how wage-bargaining 
regimes shaped the macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone.10 He argues that two 
different logics applied in the exposed and the sheltered sectors of Eurozone countries. 
In the exposed sectors, international market pressures had sufficient power to contain 
high wage demands. Therefore, exposed-sector NULC remained more or less stable in 
all Eurozone countries. But in the sheltered sectors, especially in the public sectors, in-
ternational market pressures were absent. Whether or not wage restraint in exposed 
sectors could be transmitted to the rest of the national economy depended on the over-
all coordination of the wage-bargaining system.11 As a consequence, wage increases in 
sheltered and exposed sectors remained in line in the coordinated economies but fell 
apart in the countries with uncoordinated wage-bargaining systems.
According to Hancké’s narrative, the regime type should mainly affect in the sheltered 
sector, but not in the internationally exposed sector. For a number of reasons, we won-
der whether theoretical reasoning justifies this expectation:
1. Exposed-sector employees may have an interest in nominal disinflation vis-à-vis 
trading partners (not to be confused with an interest in real wage losses) which em-
ployees in the sheltered sector lack. But this interest is collective in kind, rather than 
individual. Imagine an economy that is entirely exposed. All insights of the corporat-
ism literature (which we will discuss in detail in Section 3) still apply: Collectively, all 
employees might profit from holding down NULC; individually, it is another story. 
Once individual workforces expect other wage bargainers to engage in inflationary 
wage settlements, it becomes irrational to stick to the collective interest. In other 
words, even the exposed sector should require a coordination tool to bring about 
NULC restraint.
2. Even if we assume that rising firm-level NULC directly translate into job losses in the 
respective firm, the coordination problem does not vanish entirely. If trade unions 
are divided along ideological lines, the collective action dilemma reoccurs at the firm 
level. If we assume that NULC disinflation is unpopular, at least in the short run, 
then restraining nominal wage demands will be irrational in such a situation.
10 See also the debate on Hancké’s book in an upcoming issue of Labor History.
11 In uncoordinated wage-bargaining regimes, the sheltered sector has a “natural” leading func-
tion due to its larger size. Therefore, it is wage coordination that determines whether the leading 
role can be shifted from the sheltered to the exposed sector.
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3. Consider now what is likely to happen if exposed-sector unions overcome their co-
ordination dilemma but fail to transmit NULC restraint to the rest of the economy. 
Assume again that their preference for NULC deflation does not imply a preference 
for real wage loss. In such a situation, exposed-sector unions must choose between 
two undesired outcomes: real wage losses and losses in competitiveness. Since we 
have no reason to believe that export unions will choose competitiveness entirely at 
the expense of real wage losses, we should assume that they partially converge to the 
wage policies of the nonexposed sector. Again, this leads us to expect the amount 
of wage coordination to matter not only for the overall economy, but also for the 
exposed sector.
In this paper, we will analyze data from twelve euro countries in order to shed light 
on the determinants of NULC developments during the first ten euro years (until the 
start of the financial crisis). We will look at both economy-wide developments and the 
manufacturing sector (serving as a proxy for the exposed sector). In accordance with 
Hancké (2013a), we will confirm that NULC increases in manufacturing were indeed 
lower than the respective increases in the overall economy. Interestingly, the variance of 
nominal wage pressure was higher, rather than lower, in manufacturing than it was in 
the overall economy. In other words, we do not find the convergence of NULC increases 
in the exposed sectors that we might expect with respect to Hanckés narrative; instead 
we find unexpected amounts of variance. Applying regression techniques and a variety 
of wage-coordination indicators and numerous controls, we will show that wage coor-
dination shapes NULC both economy-wide and in manufacturing, irrespective of the 
actual wage-coordination indicator chosen.
Before we turn to the quantitative part of our study, we revisit the wage-bargaining 
literature in more detail and discuss whether its insights are still likely to apply to fixed 
exchange rate regimes.
3 Applying the wage-bargaining literature to the Eurozone
The main insight of the comparative literature on wage bargaining is that the capacity 
to perform wage restraint is endogenous to the degree of coordination in the system 
of labor relations. If wage bargaining takes place in a decentralized and uncoordinated 
manner (i.e., each unit bargains on its own), then each unit has to be concerned about 
the inflationary wage deals of other units. Therefore, it is rational to add an anticipated 
inflation surplus to one’s own wage demand. If this happens in every unit, anticipated 
inflation does actually occur. However, uncertainty about the wage deals of other units 
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disappears if wage bargaining is coordinated (through centralization or horizontal sig-
naling). Nominal wage pressures are thus likely to vary inversely with the degree of 
coordination in wage bargaining.12 
So far, our review of the wage-bargaining literature has focused on a particular dys-
function of uncoordinated wage-bargaining regimes (the anticipated inflation surplus) 
without taking into consideration the strategic capacities of coordinated wage bargain-
ing. Since the late 1990s, however, the debate on comparative wage bargaining has con-
centrated on the institutional preconditions that allow wage bargainers to act strategi-
cally and to take into account the moves of other macroeconomic “players.” This is most 
evident in the literature on the interaction between wage and monetary policy, which 
argues that conservative central banks work better in interaction with coordinated wage 
bargaining. Only if wage bargaining is coordinated can central banks impose wage re-
straint by simply threatening to impose higher interest rates (Hall/Franzese 1998; Sos-
kice/Iversen 1998). The decisive point for our analysis is that this literature ascribes a 
certain capacity for long-term, foresighted, strategic action to coordinated wage bar-
gainers, a capacity that uncoordinated wage bargainers lack.
Yet another insight into the preconditions and functions of coordinated wage bar-
gaining comes from the comparative literature on production regimes (Streeck 1991; 
Hall/Soskice 2001). This literature theorizes the interaction of production-related in-
stitutions. For example, strategic wage restraint may become possible not only when 
wage bargaining is coordinated, but also when employees are institutionally protected 
against dismissals and when employers grant codetermination rights to employees. 
Both features should provide employees with a long-term perspective inside the firm 
and should therefore encourage forms of strategic cooperation that pay off only in the 
medium run. If this holds true, the institutions of wage bargaining, layoff protection, 
and codetermination are – in the language of production regime theorists – function-
ally complementary. The decisive point for our analysis is that this insight shifted the 
focus from the coordination capacity of isolated institutions to the overall coordination 
of entire production regimes (Hall/Gingerich 2004). 
Let us now consider whether the insights discussed above should apply to the Euro-
zone. To begin with, the heterogeneity of wage-bargaining regimes has not vanished 
in the ongoing process of European integration, neither in the EU-28 nor in the Euro-
zone-18 (Höpner/Schäfer 2012: section 3). Labor relations in Europe differ with respect 
to a multitude of dimensions. Among them are membership levels in trade unions and 
12 See the overviews provided in Kenworthy (2002) and Streeck/Kenworthy (2005). Hancké (2013: 
100) notes that coordination may also depress NULC through another channel: coordination 
leads to wage compression, wage compression increases incentives to push productivity, and 
productivity is the denominator of the NULC calculation. However, the time period we ob-
served was one in which wage compression declined everywhere, also (and in particular) in 
countries with moderate NULC increases, such as Germany (where NULC actually even slightly 
declined; see Section 4).
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employers’ associations, organizational degrees of fragmentation along political and 
profession lines, the presence and “encompassingness” of central collective agreements, 
vertical centralization and horizontal signaling, state intervention in wage bargaining, 
minimum wages, and inflation indexation, just to mention a few (Du Caju et al. 2008). 
It is fair to conclude that the capacity to avoid uncertainty about the inflationary wage 
deals of other bargaining unions – and the resulting capacity to abstain from anticipa-
tory inflation surpluses – should be unevenly distributed across the Eurozone.
As we have seen above, a strand of literature has additionally ascribed a certain capabil-
ity for long-term oriented, strategic wage policy to coordinated wage bargaining. Does 
the capacity to exert strategic wage restraint remain in place under conditions of fixed 
exchange rates? For two reasons, we argue that such a capacity should be even more 
pronounced when the exchange rate is fixed. Let us first imagine an exposed-sector 
trade union in a flexible exchange rate regime, and let us suppose that this trade union 
has the choice between a wage policy that is in line with advances in productivity and a 
strategy of wage moderation. We assume that the latter strategy has the disadvantage of 
being unpopular among members, at least in the short run, but it may depress export 
prices, generate trade surpluses, back up export-sector job security, and perhaps estab-
lish a basis for higher wages in the future. In such a situation, the export-sector union 
should be reluctant to consider the unpopular choice, because trade partners may de-
valuate their currency and therefore thwart the social partners’ moderation strategy. 
In other words, under conditions of flexible exchange rates, even exposed-sector trade 
unions will tend to choose their strategies mainly – or at least to a significant extent – 
with an eye to the domestic economy. 
But what happens if the exchange rate regime shifts? If trade partners cannot devaluate, 
it becomes more likely that nominal wage restraint will actually result in the enhance-
ment of price competitiveness not only in the short, but also in the medium run. Ac-
cession to a fixed currency regime should, therefore, gradually alter the relative weight 
of considerations upon which exposed-sector trade unions base their wage demands. 
Another mechanism can be expected to lead to a similar effect: the nonavailability of 
alternative macroeconomic adjustment tools. If we consider the fiscal pact as a part of 
the euro regime, three of the four macroeconomic policy instruments usually available 
become inaccessible: interest rate policies, exchange rate policies, and fiscal policies. 
What remains is the option of stimulating the economy through the export channel, 
that is, of entering into transnational wage competition (see also Hancké 2013a: chap. 
3). However, it will depend on the structure of the wage-bargaining regime whether 
this tool is available in practice or in theory only. We conclude that there is no reason to 
believe that wage coordination will forfeit its functional significance under conditions 
of fixed exchange rates.
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4 Data and methods
Dependent variables and points of observation
We will test whether the heterogeneity of European labor and wage-bargaining regimes 
contributed to the NULC divergences that emerged during the first ten euro years. For 
this purpose, we analyze yearly data from the eleven countries that introduced the euro 
as deposit money in 1999 and as hard cash in 2002, plus Greece, which joined the Eu-
rozone in 2001.13 Our last year of investigation is 2008 due to the unfolding of the 
financial and the euro crises and the emergence of the Troika regime in the subsequent 
years. In other words, we analyze the “normal” operation of the Eurozone rather than 
the crisis regime (but see the concluding section). Our dependent variables are annual 
NULC changes (percentage change from previous year) in the overall economy and 
in the manufacturing sector, the latter serving as a proxy for the exposed sector (data 
source: OECD 2014).14,15 The appendix provides tables with definitions and sources 
(Table A1), summary statistics (Table A2), and a correlation matrix (Table A3) of all 
dependent and independent variables used in this study.
Independent variables
Our substantial independent variables shall test whether the wage regime hypothesis 
sheds light on the part of the NULC variance that remains unexplained by variance in 
growth. Rather than just showing results for one wage-regime variable, we will sepa-
rately test a set of ten variables which, in different ways and from different theoretical 
angles, cover features of European wage bargaining, labor relations, and production 
regimes. The variables can be divided into five groups (see also Table A1).
13 Thus, the twelve countries we analyze are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
14 Sadly it is not possible to construct a meaningful NULC measure for the sheltered sector be-
cause data is lacking for its most important component, the public sector (to which Hancké and 
colleagues refer in their comparison of sheltered and exposed sector dynamics). NULC for the 
public sector cannot be calculated because information on the denominator of NULC, produc-
tivity, is lacking (or better: not even defined).
15 Specifically, we use quarterly benchmarked and seasonally adjusted NULC since these values 
provide better estimates than do the nonadjusted variants. For the overall economy, however, 
adjusted values are missing for Portugal and Greece. We use the nonadjusted variant for these 
countries as an estimate. An alternative proxy for the internationally exposed sector in the in-
ternational statistics is “industry,” which encompasses not only manufacturing but also mining 
and quarrying, as well as electricity, gas, and water supply (C, D and E in Revision 3.0 of the 
International Standard Industrial Classification, ISIC). We also tested this alternative proxy, and 
received the same results concerning our substantial variables (results are available from the 
authors). 
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1. The first three variables are not constructed indices but direct measures of features of 
the national wage-bargaining regimes. The variables are defined as (1) union density 
rate, in percent (net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners 
in employment); (2) employers’ organization density, defined as the net percentage of 
employees whose employers are members of their respective associations; (3) bar-
gaining coverage, in percent, which is the percentage of employees covered by wage-
bargaining agreements as a fraction of all wage and salary earners in employment, 
adjusted for possible sectors without the right to bargain. All three variables vary 
over time. Missing years have been interpolated from given years per country. The 
data source is the latest version of the ICTWSS database, version 4.0 (Visser 2013).
2. This group consists of two time-varying variables on the modes of wage forma-
tion. The first is an index on wage coordination, initially constructed by Kenworthy 
(2001). 1 stands for fragmented wage bargaining, 3 for industry-wide coordination, 
and 5 for nationally encompassing coordination (with 2 and 4 being mixed types). 
The second is an index on government intervention in wage bargaining, initially con-
structed by Hassel (2006: chap. 3). This index has five ranks as well. 1 stands for a 
minimum and 5 for a maximum of government intervention into wage formation. 
The data source is again Visser’s (2013) latest ICTWSS database (version 4.0).
3. The third group consists of two “classical” corporatism indicators, constructed for 
time periods before the euro. The first is Schmidt’s (1983) corporatism measure, 
which applies to the 1970s and early 1980s. The measure takes the value 5 for coun-
tries with strong corporatism and 1 for weak or totally absent corporatism (data 
source: Siaroff 1999: table 1). The second is Siaroff ’s integrated economy index. It 
covers the 1990s and measures the extent of social partnership in a multitude of 
spheres (in particular, wage coordination, conflict intensity of wage bargaining, co-
determination, and concertation). The data source is Siaroff (1999: table 4c).
4. The next two variables relate to the “varieties of capitalism” school and measure 
coordination not only in the labor relations sphere, but also in the corporate gover-
nance sphere. Both indicators cover 1990s data and have missing data for Greece and 
Luxembourg. Hall and Gingerich’s coordinated capitalism index combines data on 
labor market fluctuation, wage-bargaining coordination, shareholders’ rights, dif-
fused firm ownership, and stock market size (source: Hall/Gingerich 2004: 10–17). 
Höpner’s organized capitalism index consists of data on firm ownership held by the 
state and by other firms, on employees’ codetermination rights, and on the density of 
trade unions and employers’ associations (source: Höpner 2007: 12–17).
5. The last variable covers the extent of employees’ codetermination rights at the board 
level of large firms and serves as a proxy for firm-based productivity coalitions (i.e., 
coordination at the company level). This index covers the 2000s. 4 stands for em-
ployee representatives constituting more than one third of the board, 3 for employee 
representatives constituting up to one third of the board, 2 for employees’ participa-
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tion without voting power, and 1 for no board-level codetermination (this index was 
first published in Höpner 2004: 40).
Controls
In addition to these predictor variables, we use growth of real GDP (measured as per-
centage change from the previous year) as the main alternative predictor variable (see 
Section 2). The data source is OECD (2012). In order to rule out other possible influ-
ences on the dependent variable, we include a battery of control variables. These include 
controls for possible (1) sociodemographic, (2) economic, (3) political, and (4) time-
trend effects.
1. Four sociodemographic variables control for possible effects caused by country dif-
ferences in population size, unemployment, and demographic and sectoral charac-
teristics that might impact NULC changes: Population is the size of the total popula-
tion (in thousands). The data source is OECD (2010). Unemployment rate is the per-
centage of unemployed civilians in the total labor force. The source is OECD (2010). 
Elderly is the population over the age of 65 as a percentage of total population. The 
data source is the Comparative Political Data Set I, compiled by Armingeon et al. 
(2013). Service sector is the total number of people working in the service sector of 
civilian employment as a percentage of the total civilian labor force. Once again, the 
data source is Armingeon et al. (2013).
2. In addition to GDP growth, the models include GDP per capita (measured in current 
values). GDP per capita controls for effects on NULC increases due to different eco-
nomic productivity levels among countries. The data source is World Bank (2010). 
3. Two political control variables aim to rule out possible effects due to differences in 
political-institutional configurations, as well as in the party composition of the gov-
ernment: Left government is the cabinet portfolio held by social-democratic and oth-
er left parties as a percentage of total cabinet posts at time point t. The data source 
is Armingeon et al. (2013). Veto points are a common political-institutional con-
trol variable reflecting differences in constitutional structures among countries. It is 
an additive index composed of five indicators: (1) federalism (0=absence, 1=weak, 
2=strong); (2) parliamentary government=0, versus presidentialism or other=1; (3) 
proportional representation=0, modified proportional representation=1, majoritar-
ian=2; (4) bicameralism (0=no second chamber or second chamber with very weak 
powers, 1=weak bicameralism, 2=strong bicameralism); (5) frequent referenda=1. 
The data source is again Armingeon et al. (2013).
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4. Time trend: We include a time counter (number of years from 1999–2008) in order 
to capture possible unobserved heterogeneity due to time trends affecting both the 
dependent and independent variables.16
Analytical approach
Our country-year panel dataset has a pooled time-series cross-section structure with 
the yearly data of twelve countries between 1999 and 2008. In order to account for a 
possible simultaneity bias, all time-varying independent variables are lagged by one 
year (Beck/Gleditsch/Beardsley 2006: 28). Since the dependent variable has a clear met-
ric scale and can take negative as well as positive values, linear panel regression is the 
appropriate specification technique. Specifically, we fit random-effects regression with 
cluster-robust standard errors (clustered by countries) in order to account for coun-
try-wise heteroscedasticity and possible violations of independence assumption (Beck/
Katz 1995). The random-effects model (rather than a fixed-effects approach) is appro-
priate for the following reasons (Cameron/Trivedi 2010: 235–63): first, it provides a 
more efficient estimation technique than do the regular pooled OLS estimator, related 
variants of the population-averaged approach, or the pure “between” model. Second, 
it allows the estimation of time-invariant covariates. Since some of our main predic-
tor variables do not change over time and others vary only slightly with time, a fixed-
effects approach is unidentifiable or misleading for those variables. Moreover, from our 
theoretical perspective, a random-effects approach is the appropriate tool because we 
have empirical and theoretical reasons to assume that coordination regimes are rather 
“sticky” and do not change substantially across time. Hence, a random-effects approach 
is a good compromise and allows us to estimate how differences between countries re-
garding their types of coordination regimes affect differences between countries’ NULC 
changes, while providing an estimate of the possible overall within-explanation as well. 
5 Results
Before we turn to the results of the regression analysis, let us explain the overall struc-
ture of our dependent variables, our most important control variable (growth), and a 
number of variables that are causally downstream from our dependent variables (but 
which will not be subject to the subsequent regression analysis; data source: OECD). 
Table 1 displays the cumulated changes of NULC (economy-wide and manufacturing), 
growth, and inflation over our period of observation, 1999–2008 (the variables are or-
16 In a previous analysis, we used quadratic and cubic transformations of time (t, t2, and t3). Results 
were essentially the same as those presented here (available upon request).
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dered with respect to the causal narrative in Section 2: cheap credit  growth  
NULC inflation  price inflation  competitive disadvantage  current account 
deficit  debt crisis). We first look at the cumulated economy-wide NULC changes. 
Between 1999 and 2008, and taking all countries in our sample into account, NULC 
rose by 24.5 percent. If we interpret the ECB’s 2-percent price inflation target as an im-
plicit wage inflation target, it turns out that, on average, things worked pretty well dur-
ing the first ten euro years: +24.5 percent is not far away from the +21.9 percent to 
which a yearly rise of 2.0 percent cumulates after ten years. However, the average hides 
huge variance. In Germany and Austria, NULC remained more or less stable, while 
NULC rose by almost 30 percent in Portugal and about 36 to 49 percent in Greece, Ire-
land, and Spain – which are precisely the countries, besides Cyprus (not in our sample 
because it only introduced the euro later), that had to join the euro rescue fund. The 
average deviation from the average 24.5 percent NULC increase is +/–13.8 percentage 
points. The two countries closest to the average (and therefore to the ECB target) are 
France and Belgium. With respect to their NULC increases, they behaved comme il faut.17
Let us move on by comparing this information to the NULC changes in manufactur-
ing. In this sector, NULC rose more moderately than in the overall economy (by 9.6%). 
This clearly confirms the point made by Hancké and his colleagues: it was not the ex-
posed sectors but the sheltered sectors that were the main drivers of nominal wage 
pressure (Hancké 2013a). However, interestingly, the variance behind this average was 
17 Note in this context that German NULC changes were farther away from the inflation target 
than the respective changes of all other countries, including Portugal, Greece, Spain, and Ireland.
Table 1 Overview of selected variables
Cumulated 
growth, 
1999–2008, 
in percent
Cumulated 
nominal unit 
labor cost in­
creases (total 
economy), 
1999–2008,  
in percent
Cumulated  
nominal unit  
labor cost in­
creases (manu­
facturing),  
1999–2008,  
in percent
Cumulated 
price in­
flation, 
1999–2008, 
in percent
Current ac­
count surplus, 
averaged over 
1999–2008,  
in percent
Long–term 
government 
bond yields, 
averaged over 
2009–2013,  
in percent
Austria 27.2 6.4 –8.2 21.9 1.7 3.0
Belgium 23.9 20.4 7.1 24.6 2.8 3.3
Finland 37.5 16.7 –23.0 19.8 5.5 2.7
France 21.4 19.7 2.3 19.0 0.5 3.0
Germany 17.1 –1.8 –5.0 17.3 3.0 2.3
Greece 43.6 37.5 53.0 38.3 –8.6 12.5
Ireland 68.8 48.9 –11.0 44.7 –2.1 6.1
Italy 13.4 27.9 29.8 26.3 –1.2 4.7
Luxembourg 55.6 29.4 26.2 26.9 9.8 2.2
Netherlands 27.1 23.0 2.8 24.6 5.2 2.7
Portugal 17.0 29.8 13.1 45.5 –9.6 7.3
Spain 40.4 36.3 28.2 37.3 –5.9 4.8
Average 32.8 24.5 9.6 28.9 0.1 4.6
Std. dev. 16.9 13.8 21.4 10.0 5.9 3.0
Note: Authors’ own calculations from OECD sources.
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not smaller than in the overall economy; in fact, it was larger, even though all of these 
sectors were equally exposed to international competition. The average deviation from 
the mean of +9.6 percent was +/–21.4 percentage points (but note that the variance is 
partly driven by one outlier, Greece). It should not surprise us that, despite these differ-
ences, the cumulated NULC changes in the overall economy and in manufacturing are 
positively correlated (r=.45).
It is also interesting to look at some countries in more detail. The most striking one is 
surely Germany – the only country in the sample in which NULC fell both economy-
wide and in manufacturing. Like no other country, Germany has therefore (intention-
ally or not) fueled transnational wage competition, a fact to which we will come back in 
the concluding section. It is not surprising to find Greece, Italy, and Spain all located at 
the upper end of both NULC scales. In most cases with above-average economy-wide 
NULC increases, nominal wage pressures were especially large in construction (data not 
shown here). However, this does not hold true for Ireland, where wages rose especially in 
the sectors related to market services,18 but only moderately in construction and not at 
all in manufacturing (which illustrates the different channels through which sheltered-
sector NULC can increase; for this reason, analyses based on single sheltered sectors 
might be misleading). Another remarkable country is Finland with its peculiar mix of 
falling NULC in manufacturing but moderately rising NULC in trade, construction, 
finance, and market services (and also in the overall economy). In other words, Ireland 
and Finland – and to a lesser extent, the Netherlands – managed to protect their ex-
posed-sector competitiveness by nonleveling intersectoral wage increases. In this respect, 
these countries are exceptions to the rule. In all other cases, large sheltered-sector NULC 
increases were associated with substantial wage pressure in the exposed sectors, too.
Let us now turn our attention to the left side of our line of causal arrows and recall that 
much of the political economy literature interpreted diverging NULC as an outcome 
of the largely credit-driven growth divergences. Visible to the naked eye, growth and 
NULC changes in the overall economy were indeed closely related (with r equaling .64, 
according to the data in Table 1). But it is also easy to see that the differing growth rates 
leave parts of the variance in NULC increases unexplained. Two pairwise comparisons 
illustrate this nicely: Germany and Portugal suffered from nearly identical low growth 
between 1999 and 2008, but their overall NULC increases differed sharply. Finland and 
Spain were fairly similar with regard to their higher growth in the respective period, but 
again, their overall NULC increases differed significantly. Shedding light on these unex-
plained parts of the variance will be the purpose of the subsequent regression analysis. 
We finish our look at Table 1 by moving to the right side of the causality discussed in 
Section 2. These data illustrate that there is indeed a close relationship between econo-
my-wide NULC inflation and price inflation.19 Table 1 also displays data on the average 
18 Sectors G, H, I, J, K in Revision 3.0 of the International Standard Industrial Classification, ISIC.
19 The correlation is r=.83. On NULC inflation as the main determinant of price inflation, see 
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current account balances between 1999 and 2008. We see that exchange rate distor-
tions and current account imbalances were indeed connected (the correlation between 
inflation and current account deficits is r=–.74). The last column illustrates that the 
countries with high NULC increases (especially in manufacturing), high inflation, and 
current account deficits between 1999–2008 were precisely the countries that suffered 
from high risk premia on state debt in the subsequent crisis period, 2009–2013.20
Let us now turn to the regression results. We present the results of a set of regressions for 
the two dependent variables, NULC for the total economy (Table 2) and NULC for the 
manufacturing sector (Table 3). Besides GDP growth and the full set of control variables, 
each model includes one of the substantial regime-type variables. All ten regime mea-
sures are conceptually and theoretically different, capture different aspects of contempo-
rary political economies, but naturally share common ground and are therefore inter-
related (see correlation matrix, Table A3). For this reason, we test the independent effect 
of each regime variable separately, which results in ten models for the ten predictors.
For the overall economy (Table 2), the results are as follows: growth shows a significant 
positive effect throughout all equations. According to the causal path discussed in Sec-
tion 2, this is the anticipated result. In substantial terms, this result shows that, if there is 
a one-percent increase in GDP (as compared to the previous year), the expected NULC 
increase is between .3 and .4 percent (depending on the model).21 Furthermore, as we 
have argued, the regime-type variables impart independent negative effects on NULC 
increases. Seven out of ten measures show highly significant coefficients in the expected 
direction (p<.001); another two point in the expected direction but are not significant. 
In five out of the seven cases with high significance – corporatism, integrated economy, 
coordinated capitalism, organized capitalism, and company-level codetermination – 
the regime effect outperforms the growth effect, which supports our claim that our 
understanding of the exchange rate distortions in the Eurozone must have two legs to 
stand on, an economic and a political science one. 
Let us also consider why the remaining variables – bargaining coverage, union den-
sity, and government intervention – have very low effects and no sufficient explana-
tory power. Formal bargaining coverage and union density do not necessarily indicate 
coordination. Collective agreement coverage is below average in Germany, but these 
statistics hide a substantial number of firms without formal coverage that neverthe-
less use such agreements as points of reference. Also, high degrees of coverage can go 
hand in hand with wage bargainers who compete along sectoral and ideological lines, 
Ghali (1999); with regard to the Eurozone, see Collignon (2009: 430–431), Flassbeck/Lapavitsas 
(2013: 8–9), and Jones (2011: 293–294).
20 The correlations are r=.59 (NULC increases, overall economy), r=.63 (NULC increases in man-
ufacturing), r=.72 (price inflation), and r=–.81 (current account surpluses).  
21 Please note that the results show the standardized coefficients. This substantial interpretation 
comes from the unstandardized model solution, which is not shown but can be made available 
upon request. 
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as is the case in Spain. The same holds true for the share of union members among all 
employees. However, note the direction of the insignificant effect: strong nominal wage 
pressure tends to go together with weak trade unions, a remarkable fact with respect to 
the Troika’s union-busting strategies in Southern Europe (we will come back to this in 
the conclusion). In the case of our government-intervention variable, the effect is very 
close to zero, and even the sign points in the unexpected direction (i.e., intervention is 
associated with insignificantly higher NULC increases). Obviously, government inter-
vention in wages does not necessarily suppress wage inflation but rather indicates the 
presence of a problem – and it is definitely no substitute for historically grown wage 
coordination among social partners.
Table 3 reports the results for the manufacturing sector, which we treat as a proxy for 
the internationally exposed sector. Recall that the average wage increases were lower 
in this sector than in the overall economy, but the deviation from the mean was even 
larger here than in the overall economy (see Table 1). What explains this remarkable 
variance? Interestingly, the answer is not GDP growth. The growth variable shows only 
small effects across all models. Only in one out of ten models is growth significant at the 
5-percent level. In all other models, growth has a rather small or insignificant effect (but 
its positive sign still points in the expected direction).
However, in eight out of ten cases, we find strong and highly significant regime-type 
effects. This holds true for union density, employers organization density, wage coordi-
nation, corporatism, the integrated economy, coordinated capitalism, organized capital-
ism, and company-level social partnership. Again, the bargaining-coverage coefficient 
points in the expected direction but lacks significance, and also again, the government-
intervention effect is not only close to zero but also points in the wrong direction. We 
conclude that the industrial regime partly determines NULC inflation both in the over-
all economy and in the exposed sector; while growth explains a significant part of the 
variance in NULC changes in the overall economy, this effect is absent or small in the 
exposed sector. In other words, whether or not the manufacturing sector could main-
tain or even enhance its competitiveness during the first ten euro years was driven to a 
significant degree by the structure of the respective country’s industrial relations regime.
As for the control variables, the following results remain strong and robust across all 
models (both Tables 2 and 3): among the sociodemographic covariates, the unemploy-
ment rate and service sector show negative effects on NULC increase. The higher a coun-
try’s unemployment rate and the more developed its service sector – controlled for eco-
nomic growth – the lower the increases in NULC are. The variable Elderly, the population 
over 65 as a percentage of the total population, shows positive effects in a few models, 
especially for the exposed sector. The political controls show no substantial effects but 
are important in ruling out possible differences due to political-constitutional structures.
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In sum, the results of this analysis largely confirm the paper’s argument: regime-type 
variables have an independent effect on differences in NULC increases, controlled for 
GDP growth and other relevant sociodemographic, economic, and political-institu-
tional factors.
6 Conclusion: Choosing among bad options
In this paper, we have shown that the heterogeneity of European labor relations regimes 
had a significant impact on the diversity of NULC inflation levels among euro mem-
bers and, therefore, on the emergence of distortions of the real exchange rates from 
which the Eurozone suffers. This regime effect was at least as large as the effect that de-
rived from the – mainly credit-driven – heterogeneity of growth rates, and it turned out 
that the type of labor regime mattered for the exposed sector as well as for the overall 
economy. We have also shown that the significance of the regime-type effect did not 
depend on the actual regime indicator chosen. We tested a variety of indicators that, 
from different theoretical angles, all aim at capturing the difference between coordinat-
ed and uncoordinated types of labor and wage regimes. No matter whether we looked 
at coordinated wage bargaining, corporatism, integration of the economy (in the sense 
of social partnership), coordinated capitalism, organized capitalism, or company-level 
codetermination – it always turned out that the lack of coordination pushed wage infla-
tion upwards, and coordination pushed it downwards. Given the strong relationship 
between wage and price inflation and given that the synchronization of price inflation 
rates is essential for a fixed currency regime, the regime-type effect is among the factors 
that undermine a smooth functioning of the euro.
Should the regime-type effect substantially alter our thinking about the euro? Let us 
imagine a world in which the regime effect was absent, and let us go back to the causal 
narrative which we suggested as the common core among those who perceive the euro 
crisis not only as a debt crisis, but also as a macroeconomic imbalance crisis (Krugman, 
Scharpf, Sinn, and others; see Section 2). Let us also assume that the convergence of risk 
premia on state bonds has already fueled booms in some euro member countries with 
formerly high risk premia (the actual cause is not of particular importance here because 
many other reasons may exist why some countries boom while others do not; the deci-
sive point is the nonsynchronization of economic cycles). Under conditions of a single 
nominal interest rate determined by the ECB and diverging inflation rates, booming 
countries will be confronted with the decline of real interest rates, and busting countries 
will suffer from the increase of real interest rates, which should additionally fuel both 
booms and busts, respectively. This dysfunctional extension of both booms and busts 
will, however, not go on forever, because the interest-rate effect will be complemented 
by a cost effect that unfolds in the middle run. NULC inflation and price inflation will 
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cause a competitive crisis among the booming countries – in the course of which fi-
nancial market participants are likely to doubt the sustainability of balance-of-payment 
deficits – and bring the boom to an end.
Of course, this is not a nice scenario. But at least the scenario is symmetric – in the 
sense that all participating countries should sometimes experience the dysfunctionally 
enlarged boom and at other times the dysfunctionally enlarged bust. In a widely cited 
presentation, today’s IMF chief economist Blanchard has called this scenario “rotating 
slumps” (Blanchard 2007; see also Eichengreen 2010). The regime-type effect, however, 
suggests that the symmetry thesis might not hold. The symmetry can only occur if wage 
formation works similarly in similar situations. However, our analysis revealed indica-
tions for structurally determined differences in NULC developments. Once they occur, 
distortions of the real exchange rates may be more persistent than the symmetry thesis 
implies, and harsh interventions may be necessary to correct them.
Is the heterogeneity of inner-European wage-bargaining regimes a fate that will last 
forever? In principle, the steering capacity of Southern wage-bargaining institutions 
could be enhanced if those countries adapted Northern-style labor coordination. In the 
long run, this may be possible. But in the short to the medium run, the likelihood that 
this will happen is very low. We must remember that the attempts of Southern Europe 
and Ireland to effectively enlarge the coordination capacity of their wage regimes by 
applying so-called social pacts were not successful and did not survive the immediate 
pre-euro years (see, for example, Regan 2012 on Ireland, Regini/Colombo 2011 on Italy, 
and the overview provided by Hancké/Rhodes 2005). Under conditions of the euro, 
by contrast, under-average NULC increases occurred only in countries in which social 
partnership had deep historical roots, in which wage coordination was strongly insti-
tutionalized, and which had been classified as “corporatist” for decades. In other words, 
we have reason to believe that the institutions of wage coordination are eminently sticky 
and cannot be designed or transferred in the short to medium run.22,23 Even in Ger-
many, coordinated wage bargaining is the relic of a historical stroke of luck. It emerged 
under particular historical circumstances, it evolved path-dependently, and, if it were 
to erode, it would not reoccur under today’s conditions of socio-economic change, de-
industrialization, and individualization (see Hassel 1999 on the erosion thesis).
22 Europe’s North–South divide is therefore likely to persist. We have also run a cluster analysis on 
the basis of our substantial explanatory variables (available from the authors), which confirms 
that two families of nations exist within the group of the 12 countries that joined the euro in 
1999 and 2001, respectively. The first group consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands; the second group consists of France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain. As in the Goldman Sachs study that we mentioned above, an alarming 
finding is that France fits in the second cluster.
23 This also limits the prospects of transnational wage coordination: only something that is coor-
dinated internally can be coordinated transnationally. 
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Today, any speculation about the transfer of Northern-style wage coordination to the 
South would be cynical anyway, since the interventions by the European Commission 
and the Troika push Southern wage bargaining in precisely the opposite direction. As 
excellently documented by Schulten and Müller (2013), today’s interventions aim at 
weakening trade unions and strengthening company-based wage bargaining to the dis-
advantage of sectoral and nationwide wage bargaining. In the context of mass unem-
ployment, the liberalization of labor markets, and the dismantling of the welfare state, 
such interventions may indeed contribute to NULC deflation (see below). However, 
these reforms will clearly not increase the steering capacity of wage policy that is ur-
gently needed under conditions of the euro in the medium to the long run. Paradoxi-
cally, therefore, the European interventions push the Eurozone even further away from 
the institutional preconditions of optimum currency regimes (recall the quote by the 
father of optimum currency area theory, Flemming, which we cite in note 1).
Furthermore, the heterogeneity of European wage-bargaining regimes not only con-
strained a smooth functioning of the euro until the euro crisis, but also constrains a 
fair sharing of burdens today, in a situation in which diverging price levels among euro 
members urgently need to be realigned. Keynesian economists like Krugman (2011a, 
2011b) and Flassbeck (Flassbeck/Lapavitsas 2013: 17) ask Germany to inflate labor costs 
in order to free the Southern European countries from some of the pressure to deflate 
labor costs (see also Sinn 2014b: section 9, who is not a Keynesian economist, and Hall 
2012: 365, who is not a Keynesian economist). The logic of this appeal is straightforward. 
But is this likely to happen? For reasons that Hall (2012) and Iversen and Soskice (2013) 
have described in detail, the interest-based logic of the German tendency to undervalue, 
brought about by coordinated wage bargaining, is deeply rooted in the export structure 
of the German economy. Nominal wage inflation would not only raise prices vis-à-
vis other Eurozone members, but also vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, the United States, and 
Asia. Even if trade unions could commit themselves to such a strategy, wage restraint 
would presumably be undermined by company-based social pacts. What has emerged 
in Germany is not only a dual structure featuring strong unions in the public sector 
and manufacturing and weak unions in the modestly productive service sector (Palier/
Thelen 2010), but also a two-level system in which strong works councils are prepared 
to trade wage increases for job security (Hassel/Rehder 2001). The feasibility of a strat-
egy aiming to intentionally shrink the export sector may be rather unlikely everywhere, 
but particularly unlikely in Germany. The logic actually goes the other way around: 
once job security in the export sector diminishes, German wage bargainers exercise 
wage restraint. Iversen and Soskice (2013) have recently argued that Germany might 
even leave the Eurozone rather than intentionally inflate.
Given that national wage formation fails to deliver the outcomes needed by the fixed 
exchange rate regimes, the authoritarian sanctioning of wage policies seems to be the 
only option left. The Troika has demonstrated that it is, in principle, possible to impose 
harsh interventions that bring NULC down (and thereby break the fundamental down-
ward stickiness of nominal wages, see Bewley 1999), notwithstanding the huge cost in 
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terms of de-industrialization, the loss of democratic quality, and, above all, growing 
social deprivation (more than 50 percent youth unemployment in Spain, more than 60 
percent in Greece). Only in the Troika countries did NULC fall between 2009 and 2013 
– by around 15 percent in Greece, 8 percent in Spain, and 4 percent in Portugal (data: 
Eurostat).24 Harsh interventions work – at the expense of social partner autonomy and 
democratic autonomy in all policy fields that indirectly affect wages. In other words, 
the current conditions of fixed exchange rates and huge political-economic heteroge-
neity mean that both autonomy in wage bargaining and the democratic governance of 
political-economic matters affecting wages are ideas of the past.
Of course, dismantling the Eurozone is a much discussed alternative (just see Streeck 
2014: chap. 3). Yet the cost of doing away with the euro and establishing a new exchange 
rate regime may be equally huge and therefore just another bad option. Nevertheless, 
we argue that there are currently only two possible choices. The Eurozone members can 
either pay the possibly prohibitive costs of dismantling the existing European exchange 
rate regime, or they can accept authoritarian intervention into democracy and autono-
mous wage formation, despite the political and social costs this implies and the asym-
metric nature of such an intervention, which would primarily affect countries that have 
failed to meet the ECB’s inflation target upwards rather than downwards. Moreover, 
as long as the euro exists, these interventions would not establish a preliminary crisis 
regime, but rather a permanent state of affairs – a lasting European reality.
24 In contrast, NULC did not fall in such non-Troika countries as France (+5%) and Italy (+3%). 
Recall the Goldman Sachs study mentioned in the introduction that indicated the need for de-
valuation not only in Portugal, Greece, and Spain, but also in France and Italy.
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Appendix
Table A1 Variables: definition and sources
Variable Definition Source
NULC total 
economy
Annual NULC changes, measured as percentage change from previous 
year, overall economy
OECD (2014)
NULC 
manufacturing
Annual NULC changes, measured as percentage change from previous 
year, manufacturing sector
OECD (2014)
Growth t–1 Growth of real GDP, measured as percentage change from previous 
year
OECD (2012)
Population t–1 Size of total population (in 1,000s) OECD (2010)
Unemployment 
rate t–1
Percentage of unemployed civilians in the total labor force OECD (2010)
Elderly t–1 Population over 65 as a percentage of total population Armingeon et al. 
(2013)
Service sector t–1 The total of civilian employment in services as a percentage of the  
total civilian labor force
Armingeon et al. 
(2013)
GDP per capita t–1 GDP per capita (in current values) World Bank (2010)
Left 
government t–1
Cabinet portfolio held by social–democratic and other left parties as  
a percentage of total cabinet posts at time point t
Armingeon et al. 
(2013)
Veto points A political–institutional variable reflecting differences in 
constitutional structures among countries. It is an additive index 
composed of five indicators: (1) federalism (0 = absence, 1 = weak, 
2 = strong), (2) parliamentary government = 0, versus presidentialism or 
other = 1, (3) proportional representation = 0, modified proportional 
representation = 1, majoritarian = 2, (4) bicameralism (0 = no second 
chamber or second chamber with very weak powers, 1 = weak 
bicameralism, 2 = strong bicameralism), (5) frequent referenda = 1
Armingeon et al. 
(2013)
Time counter Number of years from 1999–2008 Authors’ calculation
Union density 
rate t–1 
Net union membership as a proportion of wage and salary earners  
in employment
Visser (2013)
Employers’ 
organization  
density t–1
Employers’ organization density as a proportion of the total number  
of employees in employment
Visser (2013)
Bargaining 
coverage t–1
Percentage of employees covered by wage bargaining agreements as 
a fraction of all wage and salary earners in employment, adjusted for 
possible sectors without the right to bargain
Visser (2013)
Wage 
coordination t–1
Kenworthy’s five­scale index of wage coordination: 1 = fragmented 
wage bargaining, 3 = industry­wide coordination, 5 = nationally 
encompassing coordination (2 and 4  = mixed types)
Visser (2013)
Government 
intervention t–1
Hassel’s five­scale index of government intervention: 1 = minimum to 
5 = maximum of government intervention into wage formation
Visser (2013)
Corporatism Schmidt’s (1983) five­scale corporatism measure: 1 = weak or totally 
absent corporatism, 5 = strong corporatism
Siaroff (1999: Table 1)
Integrated 
economy
Siaroff’s (1999) integrated economy index: The index measures 
the extent of social partnership based on eight indicators (in 
particular wage coordination, conflict intensity of wage bargaining, 
codetermination, concertation). Timeframe: 1990s. 
Siaroff (1999: Table 4c)
Coordinated 
capitalism
Hall and Gingerich’s (2004) index combines data on labor market 
fluctuation, wage bargaining coordination, shareholders’ rights, 
diffused firm ownership, and stock market size. Missing data for  
Greece and Luxembourg.
Hall and Gingerich 
(2004)
Organized 
capitalism
Höpner’s “organized capitalism” index consists of data on firm 
ownership held by the state and by other firms, on employees’ 
codetermination rights, and on the density of trade unions and 
employers’ associations. Missing data for Greece and Luxembourg.
Höpner (2007: 12–17)
Employees’ 
codetermination 
rights
This four­scale index covers the 2000s and measures employees’ 
codetermination rights at the board level of large firms: 4 = employee 
representatives constitute more than one third of the board, 
3 = employee representatives constitute up to one third of the board, 
2 = employees’ participation without voting power, and 1 = no board­
level codetermination 
Höpner (2004: 40)
Höpner/Lutter: One Currency and Many Modes of Wage Formation 23
Table A2 Summary statistics of all variables 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
NULC total economy 120 2.18 1.91 –2.47 9.49
NULC manufacturing 120 0.88 4.30 –9.29 21.61
Growth t–1 120 3.23 2.07 –0.91 11.03
Population t–1 120 25639.44 26397.17 426.5 82502
Unemployment rate t–1 120 7.27 3.16 1.74 18.67
Elderly t–1 120 15.93 2.09 10.85 20.24
Service sector t–1 120 0.59 0.12 0.22 0.76
GDP per capita t–1 120 31967.68 10837.50 19134.01 74421.63
Left government t–1 120 38.37 36.37 0 100
Veto points 120 1.33 1.37 0 4
Time counter 120 5.50 2.88 1 10
Union density rate  t–1 120 32.58 17.17 7.6 78
Employers’ organization density t–1 120 69.68 14.05 43.7 100
Bargaining coverage t–1 120 78.92 15.49 40.4 99
Wage coordination t–1 120 3.33 1.06 2 5
Government intervention t–1 120 3.19 0.84 2 5
Corporatism 120 2.17 1.29 1 5
Integrated economy 120 3.27 0.95 2 4.63
Coordinated capitalism 100 0.72 0.19 0.29 1
Organized capitalism 100 0.38 0.78 –0.54 1.87
Employees’ codetermination rights 120 2 1.08 1 4
Note: Summary statistics based on country­year data from twelve euro countries, 1999–2008.
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